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In this article, phenomenology, both in its philosophical and methodological 
variants, is introduced in the form of a fictional dialogue between a student 
justifying her interest in using a post-intentional phenomenological approach 
in her dissertation to her major professor. The dialogue tackles founding 
philosophers, notably Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty; contemporary 
researchers, including A. Giorgi, B. Giorgi, van Manen, and Vagle; several 
phenomenological concepts, such as intentionality, bracketing, and bridling; 
and provides examples of three distinct approaches to phenomenological 
research. Keywords: Phenomenology, Post-Intentional Phenomenology, 
Bridling, Bracketing, Intentionality 
  
As a doctoral student, I, Katherine, decided to use a post-intentional phenomenological 
approach in my dissertation research. I understood that taking a post-intentional approach 
would alter the fundamental nature of phenomenology from its focus on the essential structure 
of the lived experience of a particular phenomenon, such as the experience of sudden fright, to 
one where the tentative, complex, and often contradictory presentation of a phenomenon like 
fright would be delineated instead. Even while I made this decision, I sensed that my 
knowledge of phenomenology was too limited to develop an effective research proposal, so I 
set out one summer to immerse myself in the literature on phenomenology. I constructed a 
reading list of numerous books and articles and began reading. Holed up in a bagel shop without 
the Internet, I read these texts in chronological order, and found myself surrounded by an 
influential, foundational philosophy I never knew existed.  
Coming back to the world of academia, I struggled to find ways to share my insights, 
to explain my deep seeded commitment to the philosophy of phenomenology as well as the 
method. I realized I had not come across many peer-reviewed articles that helped navigate the 
intersections of phenomenology as a philosophy and phenomenology as a research 
methodology. While I was fortunate to have members on my dissertation committee who were 
familiar with phenomenology, many of my peers did not, and struggled to provide justification 
for their approaches. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to introduce readers to three 
distinct phenomenological approaches. Although we discuss the phenomenological concept of 
intentionality in more depth in the paper, it provides a useful way to quickly introduce the three 
approaches. Briefly, intentionality means that when we think, experience, or direct our gaze 
towards an object, something appears to us, is there, or has affected us, whether we are 
conscious of it or not. For phenomenologists, this connectedness between ourselves and the 
world in its appearing is what phenomenologists study. What distinguishes one approach from 
another is how intentionality is conceptualized. Table 1 describes these distinctions. 
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Phenomenological 
Approach 
Descriptive Interpretive Post-Intentional 
Foundational 
Theorist 
Edmund Husserl Martin Heidegger Mark Vagle 
Intentionality 
Conceptualized 
How the essential 
structures of 
phenomena are 
revealed in 
consciousness 
How the modes of 
being of phenomena 
are constituted 
within particular 
meaning-contexts 
How phenomena are 
always appearing 
and disappearing, 
and thus partial, 
multiple, and always 
in the process of 
becoming 
Table 1: Three Phenomenological Approaches 
 
So You Want to Use Post-Intentional Phenomenology for Your Dissertation Research? 
 
Melissa: Tell me about your research interests and why you think post-intentional 
phenomenology is the right approach for what you want to be able to say about your topic? 
Katherine: I am interested in exploring mothers’ parenting experiences. More 
specifically, the phenomenon of attachment parenting, which is a parenting philosophy that 
often keeps mothers and babies in nearly constant physical contact 24 hours a day. The post-
intentional phenomenological approach enables researchers to consider how mothers’ lived 
experiences of attachment parenting are constructed in various socio-cultural contexts. In 
drawing out distinctions between the natural world and the life-world, post-intentional 
phenomenology enables me to discuss the constructions of motherhood as lived, as well as 
veiled power dynamics impacting this particular approach to parenting. To be successful, this 
research approach requires an open and contemplative investigation into the meanings of 
mothers’ lived experiences, probing into what seems obvious and taken for granted. I believe 
that this position lessens my influence, as the researcher, by moving away from an authoritative 
voice to one where the “tentative manifestations” (Vagle, 2014) of participants’ lived 
experiences are presented as contextual, partial, and incomplete. This approach supports my 
interest in the complex issues of motherhood because post-intentional phenomenology requires 
researchers to examine the lived experiences of attachment parenting as malleable and 
contextually situated.  
Melissa: Okay, so you say you are interested in the experience of mothers who practice 
attachment parenting and that phenomenology can help you access this phenomenon. What are 
phenomena, then, as understood by phenomenologists? 
Katherine: There are many phenomenological strands so there are different conceptions 
of what a phenomenon is. So to answer that question, I will need to take a historical detour, 
back to the beginning of the twentieth century, and begin with Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) 
who launched phenomenology in Germany “as a new way of doing philosophy” (Moran, 2000, 
p. 1). Not originally a philosopher, Husserl turned to philosophy after having studied 
extensively in psychology, mathematics, astronomy, and the natural sciences because of 
philosophy’s focus on reason, thinking, and knowledge (Moran, 2000). Husserl was critical of 
positivism—the dominant epistemological perspective of the time—and how it reduced the 
world to that which could be measured. Furthermore, he was dissatisfied with the implications 
of the Cartesian split, or the assertion that consciousness is separate from material substances, 
such as the body or other objects in the world. Husserl transcended this thinking, arguing that 
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human consciousness is not separate from the world at all, but constituted the world while also 
being simultaneously constituted from experience with the world; knowledge comes into being 
in this relationship (Moran, 2000). With phenomenology, Husserl proposed a radical, 
philosophical approach to understanding human experience; one that he believed neither 
prioritized the subjective human or the objective world, instead prioritizing the 
interconnectedness between the two. It is in this interconnectedness that phenomena appear.  
Phenomena are, as Mark Vagle (2014) explains, “the ways in which we find ourselves 
being in relation to the world through our day-to-day living” (p. 20). Or, another way of putting 
it, is that a phenomenon is “a thing … as it presents itself to, or as it is experienced by, a 
subject” (Dahlberg, Dahlberg, and Nyström, 2008, p. 33). Essentially what these statements 
are seeking to describe is the experience of experiencing. The overall content of an experience 
is not essential to the definition of a phenomenon; the experience of could relate to a material 
good, a relationship, a memory, prejudice, language, and the like. Significantly, it is not the 
experience itself that is being studied; rather, it is the human consciousness of the experience. 
So, phenomenology is the study of these manifestations as they are in themselves (Moran, 
2000; Vagle, 2014).  
Melissa: What do you mean by “in themselves”? 
Katherine: This is where things get a bit complicated. Husserl called “human 
consciousness of”—intentionality. Unfortunately, intentionality has the general meaning of 
denoting a purposeful action which is not what Husserl, or other phenomenologists, meant by 
the term. For phenomenologists, “intentionality” refers to the fact that whenever we are in a 
state of consciousness—that is, thinking, perceiving, or daydreaming—our consciousness is 
always of some phenomenon. Husserl adapted this concept, conceived of by philosopher Franz 
Brentano, to reconnect what Descartes had separated when he conceptualized the Cartesian 
Split as a subject distinct from an object (Vagle, 2014). Husserl argued, instead, that subjects 
and objects were intrinsically linked or co-constituted, and that this co-constitution occurred in 
the intentional relation of thought itself, that is, as phenomena. When we think of a tree, for 
example, while we and the tree may exist as distinct objects in the world, what appears to us in 
consciousness is neither the tree nor ourselves, but the manifestation of a phenomenon in itself, 
often conceptualized, as in this example, as the meaning trees or “treeness” has for us. 
Therefore, the words “subject” and “object” and the idea of intentionality being a “relation” is 
problematic since the “of” that one is relating to does not necessarily exist (McIntyre & Smith, 
1989). What is being revealed in consciousness is something itself, distinct from either the 
object or subject. That is why phenomena are said to be things that appear in consciousness. 
Melissa: So phenomenologists study phenomena as they appear in intentional relations. 
Can you give me an example? 
Katherine: Sure. While personal to myself, the format for this example pulls from 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), a French philosopher who was instrumental in bringing 
phenomenology to the United States. Tonight, my mother-in-law is flying into Atlanta from 
California to stay with us for ten days. While this information is factually based, “I am able to 
discover inside this experience, as I live it through, something which is independent of the 
factual conditions” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 54)—that is, the actual events as they occurred. 
My relationship with my mother-in-law is not encompassed in these ten days. It has developed 
over several years and will continue into the future. Our relationship is influenced by the 
interactions themselves, our own beliefs and interpretations about interactions with in-laws, as 
well as corresponding cultural norms. The relationship cannot be reduced to a single visit or 
moment (although these visits and moments are also imbued with meaning). If I could pull 
together various facets of these visits, “I come to something which is neither singular nor 
contingent—namely ... [our relationship] in its essence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 54). This 
examination of my consciousness of my relationship with my mother-in-law is an example of 
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intentionality. Since phenomenological philosophers are interested in human experience, 
intentionality allows for an examination of “the object as it is apprehended” as opposed to “the 
object which is apprehended” (Macann, 1993, p. 11). This apprehension is complicated by an 
object’s manifolds, the differing apprehensions of (or intentional relationships with) an object 
that people may have, such as the different facets of my relationship with my mother-in-law. 
Husserl (1936/1970) explained that no one really experiences an object as it is “since it is 
always in motion, always, and for everyone, a unity for consciousness of the openly endless 
multiplicity of changing experiences and experienced things, one’s own and those of others” 
(p. 164).  
Melissa: Thanks, that was helpful. What is interesting is that when you were discussing 
the philosophy I had this feeling that what you would study phenomenologically would be quite 
complex but your example suggests that phenomenologists are interested in every day, taken-
for-granted experiences. What do phenomenologists study? 
Katherine: Anything can be a phenomenon. Researchers have studied their own 
breathing (Edwards, 2006), the experience of a police chase (Broomé, 2013), healthy 
adolescents’ experiences of stress-coping (Guimond-Plourde, 2009), just to name a few, so you 
can see the range of phenomena is endless. However, while many contemporary 
phenomenologists do not ground their work in the foundational phenomenological 
philosophies but draw on more contemporary theorists such as Max van Manen, Amedeo 
Giorgi, Karin Dahlberg, or Mark Vagle, just to name a few, there are important distinctions 
between studies adopting a Husserlian perspective as opposed to one influenced by Heidegger. 
So it is helpful to understand the distinct influence these two philosophers have had on the 
development of phenomenology. 
Melissa: Help me understand how these two orientations would change the study’s 
approach? 
Katherine: Part of the distinction has to do with how each of the different 
phenomenological philosophers theorized intentionality. Because their conceptualizations of 
intentionality are quite different, it changes the phenomenon, or what it is you think you are 
studying. For Husserl the phenomenon appears to us as a mental state which is “intrinsically 
intentional, then, because it itself includes ... an intrinsically ‘meaningful,’ or ‘meaning-
giving,’ component” (McIntyre & Smith, 1989, p. 162). For example, while we have many 
experiences of our love for our children, this love manifests itself in many different ways, in 
different contexts, and through different conscious acts. Husserl believed that the essence of 
the phenomenon would be revealed by undergoing a “phenomenological reduction” (Husserl, 
1913/1962, p. 103). Husserl used many images to explain this process. One that theorists like 
to share is the idea of peeling an onion. Imagine that the core of the onion is the thing in-itself 
and each layer is some cultural, social, or theoretical facet of “onion” that distorts what the 
onion is in-itself. By peeling away preconceived and learned meanings of the object, one might 
reach the fundamental meaning (or the essence) of the phenomenon, or that which does not 
change as the layers are peeled away.  
In contrast, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), who was both Husserl’s student and a critic 
of Husserl’s work, came to phenomenology through his classical training in philosophy. 
Heidegger felt that Husserl lacked ontological focus by failing to examine deeply enough the 
question of being, that is, the being of human being. While phenomenology is inherently 
ontological in orientation in that its focus is on the nature and being of phenomenal objects, 
Heidegger was critical of ontological approaches such as Husserl’s that treated all objects “as 
‘things,’ as what is simply there” (Moran, 2000, p. 196). This kind of approach ignores the 
historical and cultural assumptions shaping everyday existing. Philosophy, therefore, requires 
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an enquiry into the manner in which the structures of Being are revealed through 
the structures of human existence, an enquiry, furthermore, which could only 
be carried out through phenomenology, now transformed into hermeneutical 
phenomenology, since the phenomena of existence always require 
interpretation, and hermeneutics is the art of interpretation. (Moran, 2000, p. 
197) 
 
In his most important work, Being and Time, Heidegger abandoned Husserl’s focus on 
consciousness, focusing instead on the nature of human existence, reconceptualizing 
philosophy as “a way of life” (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 214). 
Heidegger (1927/1998) asserted that the work of phenomenology is “to let what shows 
itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself” (p. 30). This assertion holds 
something of a double meaning. Phenomena are self-showing, they reveal themselves. Yet it 
is not enough to simply describe these phenomena as they appear, for there is also meaning in 
what is concealed behind that appearance. For example, a fever can be a symptom of underlying 
illness or infection, which is not itself visible. In order “to let what show itself be seen from 
itself, just as it shows itself from itself,” one must also bring to awareness what is concealed 
by a phenomenon’s appearance. Heidegger believed that a human engages with the world 
interpretatively, having “the inclination to be entangled in the world in which it is and to 
interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light” (1927/1998, p. 18). In this way, 
Heidegger moves intentionality out of the structures of the mind and into “the intentional 
structure of Dasein ... [as] being-in-the-world” (Klaskow, 2011, p. 98). For Heidegger the 
world is the meaning context and so the intentional relationship, which he calls “comportment,” 
is this human-world relation (Klaskow, 2011). Humans do not make sense of the world; as 
beings-in-the-world they engage actively in its interpretation.  
Vital to this discussion of intentionality, however, regardless of the approach taken—
Husserlian or Heideggerian—is the recognition that phenomena have a reality and truth that 
extends beyond our perceptions of them. In phenomenology (unlike in positivism), the world 
and/or phenomena cannot be reduced to our perceptions of them (Heidegger, 1927/1998; 
Husserl, 1936/1970; Merleau-Ponty, 1964). As we could never examine (or even encounter) 
each and every manifold of a phenomenon’s identity, some understanding will always be 
lacking. 
Melissa: Can you explain what you mean by lacking? 
Katherine: I’ll try. Encountering understandings that are paradoxical is believed to be 
an inherent part of the phenomenological process. Paradox is first introduced as the philosopher 
begins a phenomenological inquiry with investigating obvious and taken for granted 
phenomena. Husserl (1936/1970) explained that: 
 
From the beginning the phenomenologist lives in the paradox of having to look 
upon the obvious as questionable, as enigmatic, and of henceforth being unable 
to have any other scientific theme than that of transforming the universal 
obviousness of the being of the world … into something intelligible. (p. 180) 
 
After this first confrontation, one will continue to encounter paradox in the investigation. 
Husserl explained that as philosophers continue to “go back” (p. 177) and “through ever 
renewed self-reflections … [they] become involved again and again in paradoxes, which 
arising out of uninvestigated and even unnoticed horizons, remain functional and announce 
themselves as incomprehensibilities” (p. 181). For example, in my dissertation study, mothers 
could simultaneously assert that staying home with their children has been the most meaningful 
experience of their lives while also in the same interview make statements about their kids 
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driving them crazy or expressing boredom with their daily routines (Soule, 2013). Through a 
phenomenological examination, one is likely to face the contradictions and ambiguities that 
must always exist as we consider different points-of-view and multiple, often contradictory, 
experiences, particularly when we look beyond our own consciousness of.  
Moving into even more abstract thinking, Sokolowski (2000) explained that “the way 
things appear is part of the being of things; things appear as they are, and they are as they 
appear. Things do not just exist; they also manifest themselves as what they are” (p. 14). In 
other words, our perception of a phenomenon becomes a part of that phenomenon and the 
identity of a phenomenon continues to develop through intentionality. A phenomenon is its 
manifolds of identity. My conceptualization of an object, positive or negative, true or false, 
becomes a part of that object’s identity. If I perceive a mother to be practicing attachment 
parenting, then my perception of her parenting style becomes a part of my phenomenological 
understanding of her. Husserl (1913/1962) required that what we perceive “is simply to be 
accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself” 
(p. 83). So, this mother’s parenting style, as a manifold of her identity, reveals one dimension 
of my perception of her. Simultaneously, my overall experience of this individual becomes 
integrated into the intrinsic intentional structure of attachment parenting as a phenomenon.  
Heidegger also believed that our phenomenological findings remain partial and 
exploratory. He suggested that even as one conducts a phenomenological inquiry, 
understanding “gets enshrined in a methodological principle which might be expressed as the 
necessarily complementary character of revealing and concealing, covering over and 
uncovering, closing off and dis-closing” (Heidegger, 1927/1998, pp. 67-68). Heidegger 
suggested that such partial understandings are a quality of the human inquirer, writing that 
“what remains concealed … or what falls back and is covered up again, or shows itself only in 
a distorted way, is not this or that [phenomenon] but rather … the being of beings” (p. 31). 
It is important to point out that in acknowledging the paradoxes and partiality revealed 
in an inquiry these philosophers are not faulting phenomenology but acknowledging a quality 
of human consciousness. In fact, they critique social scientists who adopt an objectivist 
scientific approach for denying the role of human awareness in their own fields. For example, 
Husserl (1936/1970) wrote: 
 
If we cease being immersed in our scientific thinking, we become aware that we 
scientists are, after all, human beings and as such are among the components of 
the life-world which always exists for us, ever pregiven; and thus all of science 
is pulled, along with us, into the—merely “subjective-relative”—life-world…. 
In our attempts to attain clarity we shall suddenly become aware, in the face of 
emerging paradoxes, that all of our philosophizing [i.e. scientific theorizing] up 
to now has been without a ground. (pp. 130-132) 
 
Melissa: I can begin to see the different ways that a phenomenon has been 
conceptualized in phenomenology. I understand that these two philosophies have influenced 
two distinct ways of conducting phenomenological research, often referred to as descriptive 
versus interpretive phenomenological research. 
Katherine: Husserl and Heidegger’s debates and differences spawned many 
interpretations of their theories and the development of other phenomenological philosophies, 
such as, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas, to 
name a few. This division stems from phenomenology’s philosophical roots. The founding 
philosopher, Husserl (1936/1970) conceived of phenomenology as a descriptive science 
Katherine E. Soule & Melissa Freeman                     863 
focused on the constitution of phenomena in consciousness1. As Quentin Lauer (1958) 
explains: “If one has described phenomena, one has described all that can be described, but in 
the very constant elements of that description is revealed the essence of what is described” (pp. 
3-4). On the other hand, Heidegger, believing that the phenomenon manifests in engagement, 
would not seek the essential structures of a phenomenon in consciousness. Rather, since the 
meaning of the phenomenon is entangled in our everyday existence, revealing its meaning 
requires engagement with the interpretative engagement itself. As a result, Husserl’s 
conceptualization of phenomenology led to the descriptive (i.e., transcendental) 
phenomenological and human science research approaches; while, Heidegger’s developments 
would lead to interpretive (i.e., hermeneutic) approaches. The divide between interpretive and 
descriptive have spawned all sorts of contemporary theorists, some who lean more towards the 
descriptive side, with others engaging the interpretive side.   
Melissa: Can you describe these? 
Katherine: Yes, and I will also give you an example of each. Descriptive 
phenomenological inquiry, as discussed by psychologists and phenomenologists Giorgi and 
Giorgi (2003) sets out to describe phenomenon. In seeking to describe a phenomenon, the 
researcher focuses on what is present in the data and ultimately provides a rich, intrinsic 
account of the findings. Dahlberg et al. (2008) iterated that “the researcher’s description is not 
naïve, as is the informant’s…. [The] researcher is careful not to make definite what is 
indefinite” (p. 241). In this method, data come from varied sources including narratives, 
interviews, fieldwork, and observation. The results of this phenomenological research are 
aimed “at describing a phenomenon and its meanings without interpretation, explanation, or 
construction” (p. 241). In order to describe a phenomenon and its meanings, a researcher must 
take nothing for granted; this is done by questioning and pondering even what seems obvious. 
Although descriptive phenomenologists like Giorgi draw on Husserl’s philosophy, they caution 
not to confuse their approach with the philosophy. Giorgi (2000) states clearly that what he has 
proposed as a methodology is “scientific phenomenology” (p. 12) to emphasize its rigorous, 
applied nature, not philosophy, and therefore should not be assessed as such. Like Husserl, the 
researcher is interested in the essence of a phenomenon. Essences are arrived at through 
phenomenological analysis of the descriptions provided by subjects of experienced situations. 
From a phenomenological perspective, an essence is the meaning-structure that reveals the 
“essential characteristics of the phenomenon without which it would not be that phenomenon” 
(Dahlberg, 2006, p. 11). The search for essences transcends the contextual complexity of an 
individual’s experience of a phenomenon, to reveal those descriptors most essential to it being 
of that phenomenon (Dahlberg, 2006; Giorgi, 2000). Throughout the research process, one 
restrains oneself from interpreting the data, deliberately suspending one’s interpretations, in 
order to be honest to the data. In analysis, the researcher describes the phenomenon, 
emphasizing its most meaningful parts, and supported by illustrative segments of data (in all 
of their nuances). The descriptive nature of this research approach is seen in its constant 
emphasis on describing the phenomenon. 
One example of this kind of approach is Barbro Giorgi2 (2011) who examined clients’ 
experiences of “pivotal moments” in therapy. As a psychologist and a researcher, she 
understood a pivotal moment “as a moment experienced by a client that dramatically changed 
something for the better for him or her, a change that was experienced as overcoming some 
kind of problem, an experience of some form of important improvement or progress from his 
                                                          
1 For Husserl, phenomenology offered a corrective to the accepted view that scientific inquiry resulted in the 
appropriation of “true” or unmediated accounts of reality (see Applebaum, 2012, for an overview of the 
relationship between Husserl’s perspective on science and descriptive phenomenology). 
2 Barbro Giorgi is the late wife of Amedeo Giorgi. Both have made significant contributions to the branch of 
descriptive phenomenology. 
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or her perspective” (p. 66). Three participants, who each identified as having experienced a 
pivotal moment, were interviewed. During the interviews, the participants were asked to recall 
these pivotal moments by describing the overall context of the moment, what led up to the 
moment, what happened in the moment, and how the participant understood this moment to 
have brought about dramatic change (Giorgi, 2011).  
In data analysis, the researcher reported maintaining the phenomenological attitude 
through bracketing, reading through the data set in its entirety, rereading the data set with the 
research focus in mind, clarifying and explicating participants’ pivotal moments, describing 
the essence of pivotal moments in therapy, and determining the structures/constituents of the 
pivotal moment. Since the work of bracketing is often misunderstood, it is worth stating that 
B. Giorgi did not code her data; rather, she bracketed, identifying meaning units that were then 
combined to represent “constituents,” or the essence of the phenomenon. For example, 
constituents, such as “trust & safety,” “emotional involvement,” and others were considered 
while retaining their “empirical variations” (p. 73). By working these manifolds of identity, the 
essence of the experience of pivotal moments in therapy is slowly brought forward. Eventually, 
the essential structure of the phenomenon is described. As a result of this analysis, B. Giorgi 
reported that “the pivotal moment is experienced as a figural moment within the therapeutic 
process where a serious challenge to old assumptions takes place, necessitating a break from 
old cognitive, affective and behavioral patterns in a context of trust and safety within the 
therapeutic relationship” (p. 61). In this way, her research allowed B. Giorgi to move from a 
description of what a pivotal moment in therapy is to be able to describe the experience of the 
pivotal moment. 
Melissa: You mentioned bracketing. Can you explain that concept to me? 
Katherine: Bracketing is often used, albeit differently, in interpretive phenomenological 
research so why don’t I describe that first and then explain bracketing. 
Melissa: Okay. 
Katherine: In contrast to descriptive phenomenological research, the interpretive 
approach stems from the belief that researchers conduct research because they have a pre-
existing interest in human sciences, which is inherently interpretive. van Manen (1990) felt that 
“to do research is always to question the way we experience the world, to want to know the 
world in which we live as human beings” (p. 5). This research can utilize various sources of 
data including interviews, narrative, and text. In all cases, the researcher must remain vigilant 
and remember that clarifying and explicating the phenomenon is the point of the research. van 
Manen (1990) stressed that phenomenological research is 
 
extraordinarily demanding of its practitioners … there will be many temptations 
to get side-tracked or to wander aimlessly and indulge in wishy-washy 
speculations, to settle for preconceived opinions and conceptions, to become 
enchanted with narcissistic reflections or self-indulgent preoccupations, or to 
fall back onto taxonomic concepts or abstracting theories. (p. 33) 
 
In this approach great emphasis is placed on the language used to interpret the phenomenon. 
“As researchers, we must have good enough knowledge of language in the way that we must 
have words for, and be sensitive enough to nuances, to describe the full spectrum of meaning, 
and that essential structure of meaning that hopefully emerges within our research” (Dahlberg 
et al., 2008, p. 17). In other words, the language one uses to describe the findings may elucidate 
the phenomenon or serve only to further obscure it. van Manen (1990) believed that “re-
thinking, re-flecting, re-cognizing” (p. 131) is required to interpret the results of a 
phenomenological human science study, which should be richly narrated and “oriented to the 
world in a pedagogic way” (p. 151). Ultimately, through the text, the researcher should 
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“attempt to disclose the deep meaning of our world” (p. 131). The interpretive, hermeneutical 
nature of this method is seen in its unfaltering focus on understanding, explaining, and making 
meaning of the phenomenon. 
For example, Philo Hove (1999) used interpretive phenomenology to examine the 
experience of wonder occurring during mindfulness retreats. In his dissertation, the researcher 
explored his own experiences, as well as materials from interviews, stories, poetry, and other 
narratives. The research includes the development of phenomenological narratives and 
hermeneutical inquiry. Early in the dissertation, Hove prepared the reader for the careful, 
thought-filled work of interpretive phenomenology: 
 
If the pace of my inquiry is (deliberately) slow it is because it is precisely the 
haste of our lives which passes over, subdues, forecloses the transparent 
punctum of wonder.... When we stop, linger, observe and consider, a new 
quality emerges in these moments, an interest and surprising urgency to things 
as they are, and as they change. (pp. 7-8) 
 
True to his word, Hove moves slowly, introducing mindfulness retreats by presenting a 
discussion of modern life, picking up topics such as postmodernism, theory, materialism, 
nostalgia, and so on. He moves on to describe his own experience with a mindfulness retreat 
and wonder but remains deliberate, not wanting to “move too quickly or mean to explain too 
much” (p. 34). Turning his attention to wonder, Hove considers the presence, absence, and 
qualities of wonder in a variety of contexts, drawing particular attention to the language used 
within the text as well as by others.  
Entering into the analysis of interviews and participants’ experiences of wonder during 
mindfulness retreats, Hove organizes the discussion around thematic reflections such as Retreat 
From, Retreat Into, and Return to the “World.” van Manen (2011) emphasized that in 
interpretive phenomenology, such themes are not generalizations, rather they are “the 
constellations that make up the universes of meaning we live through. By the patterns and light 
of these themes we can navigate and explore such universes” (para. 3).  
Throughout the text, Hove’s awareness of intentionality is evident as he speaks directly 
to the reader, explaining his steps and purpose. Questions are posed as a method of inviting the 
reader to follow in Hove’s hermeneutic process. van Manen (2011) explained: “We can write 
notes and paragraphs on the basis of our reading and other research activities. Of course, 
composing these ‘linguistic transformations’ is not a mechanical procedure. Rather it is a 
creative, hermeneutic process” (para. 7). Through these efforts, Hove found: “The phenomenon 
of wonder is therefore not the discontinuity of experience, but of experience as conceived. It is 
in wonder, that we are urged to be fully who we are” (p. 78). 
Melissa: Nice example. So, tell me about bracketing. 
Katherine: Husserl (1936/1970) described bracketing as a three-level process through 
which one synthesizes and comes to understand the phenomenon of focus. This process begins 
with the perception of a phenomenon and then narrows to examine specific parts of the 
phenomenon and finally to a revelation of the universal and essential structure that constitutes 
the phenomenon. While this analysis occurs with all forms of phenomena, I will use an 
everyday example to illustrate the process. In the first level of bracketing, the phenomenon is 
“taken initially as it is given perceptually: as ‘normal,’ simply there, unbroken, existing in pure 
ontic certainty…[a] guideline for inquiring back into the multiplicities of manners of appearing 
and their intentional structures” (Husserl, 1936/1970, p. 172). Walking through a park I 
approach a group of children in a grassy area. At first, I simply take note of the rapid movement, 
flashes of color, and laughter. I am simply perceiving the group as a group. During the second 
level of the process, the phenomenon is considered in terms of what is particular, most 
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important, and most general about its character (Husserl, p. 172). Looking more closely at the 
group, I zero in on a ball. The ball is black and white. It is being kicked by the children. I 
continue to notice the group but I now focus on one of its parts: the ball. In the final level of 
reflection, the inquirer strives for “synthesis of intersubjectivity … through which all ego-
subjects … are oriented toward a common world and the things in it” (Husserl, p. 172). At this 
stage, I move beyond perception and articulate a relationship between the whole (the group) 
and the part (the ball). I now realize the children are playing soccer. Sokolowski (2000) 
explained: “What happens in this third stage is that the whole … and its part are explicitly 
distinguished. A relation between them is distinctly registered…. We have moved from 
sensibility to intellection, from mere experiencing to an initial understanding” (p. 90). 
Gadamer (1960/1994) summed up this process, stating that “we must understand the 
whole in terms of the detail and the detail in terms of the whole” (p. 291). This process 
highlights human rationality, the movement from experiencing to judging. In 
phenomenological terms, this process is called constitution, meaning to bring a phenomenon 
“to light, to articulate it” (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 92). It is understood that we cannot bring to 
light anything that does not present itself to us as we may be mistaken in our understandings. 
For example, we might determine a shirt to be brown as we pull it from our dark closet, only 
to realize that the shirt is red in the light of the room. While we were mistaken in the color of 
the shirt, its brown color in darkness is a quality of the shirt, a manifold of its identity.  
Although constitution is a three-level process, it is also recursive. In my example, I 
perceived the children to be playing soccer. I now notice that children are wearing different 
clothes. Some have on shoes and others do not. Moving again through the third-level, I 
understand this to be an unorganized soccer game. Through constitution, I generate fractional 
understandings; however, these understandings combine to increase my intelligibility of the 
phenomenon. 
Having grasped the concept of constitution, I can recognize that my understandings of 
the world are a product of my mental processes. Taking a step back from constituting meaning, 
I can examine the process of constitution. Reflecting on my example, I might wonder: Why did 
I categorize that group of people as children? What other ways might I have described them? 
What prior knowledge allowed me to recognize their game as unorganized? Is it possible that 
their game was organized? Through this sort of questioning, I have begun to examine my own 
awareness of the phenomenon. In phenomenological terms, I have begun bracketing, which is 
a way of consciously putting aside preconceived understandings of the phenomenon or 
“fundamental structures in order to allow more basic objectifying acts of consciousness to 
become visible in themselves” (Moran, 2000, p. 149).  
Although we know the world to exist, in bracketing we examine how the world comes 
to be constituted through our consciousness. Bracketing requires one to distance oneself from 
the phenomenon of interest by holding the phenomenon outside of one’s understandings of it. 
In this way, Ricoeur (1981/2002) suggested, “we interrupt lived experience in order to signify 
it” (p. 590). Husserl offered an example to help clarify this action. Consider a personal, deeply 
held conviction. Without surrendering this conviction, bracketing asks us to examine the 
conviction from a place of interest and uncertainty. Can you imagine a person for whom this 
conviction would not ring true? Can you imagine someone approaching this conviction for the 
first time uncertain of its value? From that place, bracketing begins. We view the belief, analyze 
its character, follow its possible coherencies. We examine, in pure reflection, what occurs as 
we reach insight. By examining our convictions this way, we consider the what and how of our 
conscious processes.  
We can similarly hold all phenomena, all of nature, outside of our understandings of 
them. At the same time, suspending phenomena “is not to deny them [their existence] and even 
less to deny the link which binds us to the physical, social, and cultural world. It is on the 
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contrary to see this link, to become conscious of it” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 49). After 
bracketing we are left with phenomena as experienced; “phenomena which are grasped by 
reflection as they are absolutely in themselves” (Husserl, 1917/2002, p. 130). This reflection, 
Husserl indicated, is now “pure and exclusive” (p. 130). Through bracketing, anything, any 
“persons, personal communities, social forms and formations, poetic and plastic formations, 
every kind of cultural work - all become in this way headings for phenomenological 
investigations” (Husserl, 1917/2002, p. 131). However, it would not be, for example, a 
phenomenological study of religion but a phenomenological study of the human experience of 
religion. Continuing this example, Moran (2002) explained that through bracketing “the focus 
is on the manner in which the sacred is experienced by the religious practitioner—or indeed as 
denied by the atheist—rather than on the attempt to ascertain if there really is or is not a domain 
of the sacred as it were ‘behind’ the belief” (p. 6). No matter the phenomenon of interest, 
phenomenological inquiry examines the human awareness of the phenomenon. After 
bracketing, “consciousness and what it is conscious of” is our field for pure reflection (Husserl, 
1917/2002, p. 131).  
While Husserl used the term bracketing to label this process, many since have likened 
the process to quotations. In writing, an author uses quotation marks to separate her own ideas 
and words from everyone else’s. Similarly, bracketing serves as “a series of methodological 
attempts to neutralize” (Moran, 2002, p.15) our own knowledge, experiences, and biases of a 
phenomenon. As van Manen (1990) has indicated: “the problem of phenomenological inquiry 
is not always that we know too little about the phenomenon we wish to investigate, but that we 
know too much” (p. 46). Through this process, it is hoped that we can now “look at what we 
normally look through” (Sokolowski, 2000, p. 50). 
Bracketing is an iterative process that requires awareness of one’s preconceptions and 
significant contemplation. To “be guided by the things themselves is obviously not a matter of 
a single, ‘conscientious’ decision, but is ‘the first, last, and constant task’” (Gadamer, 
1960/1994, pp. 266-267). Bracketing is meant to allow the phenomenon to reveal itself. 
Ultimately, phenomenological inquiry is difficult work. “It demands toilsome concentration on 
the data” (Husserl, 1913/1962, p. 259). Yet, Husserl (1917/2002) reminded his readers: 
 
Just as pure geometry is not bound to shapes observed in actual experience but 
instead inquires into possible shapes and their possible transformations … pure 
phenomenology proposes to investigate the realm of pure consciousness and its 
phenomena not as de facto existents but as pure possibilities with their pure 
laws. (p. 132) 
 
This troublesome, penetrating work occurs in the returning again and again to the bracketed 
phenomenon, one moves through one’s layers of preconception, as though peeling through an 
onion, until understanding becomes refined. In more contemporary language, van Manen 
(1990) has described bracketing as “a process of reflectively appropriating, of clarifying, and 
of making explicit the structure of meaning of the lived experience” (p. 77). 
Melissa: That was very interesting. So bracketing, contrary to how it sounds, is more 
than just suspending judgment. But since you said you wanted to do a post-intentional study, 
this third way you have mentioned a few times, there has to be something these two approaches 
aren’t allowing you to do? 
Katherine: For those of us working in today’s world of qualitative inquiries, bracketing 
may sound familiar, even conventional, but Husserl’s developments were a significant 
departure from the philosophical and scientific inquiries of his time. He believed that all 
knowledge, whether oriented towards the humanities or the sciences, were affected by 
preconceptions and required bracketing in order to eliminate that effect. Further, Husserl 
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(1936/1970) called for a withholding of “all objective theoretical interests [and] any critical 
position-taking which is interested in their truth or falsity” (p. 135). Vagle (2011b) drew on the 
spirit of Husserl’s departure from accepted research traditions in his desire “to accomplish this 
sort of disruptive, radical work” (p. 11).  
In an attempt to reimagine phenomenological research away from its descriptive-
interpretive split, Vagle (2011a, 2011b, 2014) developed post-intentional phenomenology. 
This was not an attempt to bridge or reconnect the two emphases but to conceive of 
phenomenology as a human science research method in an entirely new way. Rather than 
miring “into a circular debate only important to those inside the game” (Vagle, 2011a, p. 6), 
Vagle strove to combine what was useful from both sides with elements from other, 
complementary philosophies. Vagle (2011a, p. 6) explained: 
 
For me, post-structural conceptions of how knowing and understanding are 
fleeting, momentary, tentative, and dangerous opens up phenomenology 
more—it draws out phenomenology not only as a philosophy of lived 
experience, but also as a philosophy capable of being used toward political ends. 
 
While bringing phenomenological research methods to contemporary ways of thinking, Vagle 
also strove to sustain phenomenology’s philosophical roots. By connecting phenomenology 
with other theories, researchers can seek understandings “that neither [phenomenology nor 
post-theories] can accomplish in the same ways on their own” (Vagle, 2011a, p. 11).  
Melissa: So how does this blending affect the conceptualization of intentionality? 
Katherine: Good question. In evaluating phenomenological research approaches, Vagle 
critiqued researchers who disregarded intentionality, focusing on the lived experience rather 
than the experience of. In addition to emphasizing the importance of examining intentionalities, 
post-intentional phenomenology also requires researchers to consider how intentionality is 
entwined in the research process. As an intentional relationship exists between all researchers 
and the phenomena they investigate, “dynamic intentional relationships … tie participants, the 
researcher, the produced text and their positionality together” (Vagle, 2010, p. 399). For Vagle 
(2014) intentionality is 
 
constantly being constructed, deconstructed, blurred, and disrupted.... [It] is 
running all over the place, all the time—at times with clarity, but most often in 
the gnarliness of life.... So, when I “post” intentionality I am saying that 
intentionalities cannot be traced. One cannot start with the stable subject and try 
to follow that subject’s intending toward and with the world. That very subject 
is both constructed and constructing, not dissolved. (p. 113) 
 
Intentionalities, as phenomena themselves, remain complex, partial, and indefinite. For these 
reasons, a researcher cannot simply state the route from subject through consciousness of to 
phenomenon. This conceptualization allows researchers to discuss the situated meanings of 
intentionality (or lived experience) as separate from the essence of a phenomenon as well as 
how power and other social dynamics infiltrate the world as lived. For example, going back to 
the intentional relationship I have with my mother-in-law, I am not seeking to reveal “the actual 
events as they occurred,” or the essence of the phenomenon as in descriptive phenomenology, 
nor am I seeking to bring into visibility the constellations or themes that express the 
phenomenon as a complex lived experience as in interpretive phenomenology. Rather, a post-
intentional approach would seek both to reveal the variety of experiences I have had with my 
mother-in-law while simultaneously disrupting the conventions, power structures, and other 
taken-for-granted notions that are brought forth in these rememberings and continuously 
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deferring any final interpretation of this phenomenon. In this way the focus is not primarily on 
the bringing-into-visibility of a phenomenon but is one that seeks to critically demonstrate how 
all phenomena are the effects of interpretive processes and are therefore open to re-
interpretation. 
Melissa: How about bracketing? Do post-intentional phenomenologists bracket? 
Katherine: Post-intentional phenomenologists prefer to bridle. They have adopted 
Karin Dahlberg’s (2006) concept of “bridling.” Bridling includes the procedures covered by 
bracketing but extends these beyond the focus on one’s preconceptions (Dahlberg, 2006). “As 
researchers ... [we are] immensely involved in the explication of meaning. Bridling then means 
to scrutinize the involvement with, this embodiment of, the investigated phenomenon and its 
meaning(s)” (p. 16). Dahlberg et al. (2008) add that bridling also “systematically and carefully 
scrutinize[s] the road to the decision of understanding” (p. 130). These researchers believe that 
phenomena are intimately connected to other phenomena, as well as to the researchers 
themselves. Researchers must take time to detangle themselves from their intentionalities with 
the phenomenon and the research processes, probing their own understandings and everyday 
interactions. Dahlberg et al. (2008) wrote that “the open bridling attitude should be practiced 
with such tenderness and sensitivity that the phenomenon is allowed to keep its indefiniteness 
as much and for as long as possible” (p. 134). So, bridling is the process through which post-
intentional phenomenologists examine their own intentionalities with the phenomenon, as well 
as the intentional relationships introduced through the process of conducting research. Post-
intentional phenomenology requires researchers to actively engage in bridling throughout the 
research process in order to acknowledge preconceptions, assumptions, biases, and prejudices, 
as well as their impact on the research process, data analysis, and interpretations.  
Melissa: Well, I can see now why you would be interested in using a post-intentional 
approach. How do you think your study will be carried out? 
Katherine: For my doctoral research (Soule, 20133), I want to use post-intentional 
phenomenology to examine the interconnected meanings that come into being as mothers 
practice attachment parenting. If I could recruit four or five mothers, I would interview them 
each at least 3 times. Following phenomenological interviewing, the interview questions would 
try to keep the attention focused on participants’ lived-experiences and meaning-making. That 
means participants will be invited to share and reflect openly on their personal experiences and 
understandings in order to explore the interconnected meanings that come into being as a 
mother practices attachment parenting.  
I will probe to seek out distinctions, explore how participants’ experiences are different 
from my own or from other participants’ experiences. The purpose of seeking out these 
distinctions is to more fully explore the phenomenon, to challenge my own biases and 
assumptions, and to ensure data quality, thereby increasing the credibility of the research 
findings. For example, if participants focus on positive aspects of an experience, for example 
breastfeeding, I would want to ask whether they have experienced breastfeeding in other ways 
too. Throughout the research processes, I will continuously contemplate the interconnected 
meanings that come into being as mothers practice attachment parenting. Each interview will 
inform future interviews and participants can be sought out during analysis as well to help me 
examine places of agreement, divergence, and ambiguity.  
Recognizing that the phenomenon of attachment parenting is intimately connected to 
other phenomena, as well as to my own experiences, I will take the time to detangle myself 
from my intentionalities with the phenomenon and the research process. I expect to write 
bridling statements and conduct bridling interviews (cf. Dahlberg et al., 2008; Vagle, 2009) 
                                                          
3 Katherine Soule has successfully defended her dissertation (see Soule, 2013) but so as not to break the flow of 
the conversation, recreates it here as a tentative design rather than one that has been completed. 
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whenever I feel unsettled, uncomfortable (or too comfortable) with an aspect of the study. Post-
intentional phenomenology seeks to capture the complexity and richness of a phenomenon 
within the varied, and often contradictory, discourses that surround the topic. 
By considering all facets of mothers’ experiences, including the embodiment of 
carrying a fetus, giving birth, and the connection or disconnection between attachment 
parenting and normative parenting discourses, I hope to capture this complexity. I will probably 
draw on Vagle’s (2014) concept of tentative manifestations of the phenomenon. The deliberate 
phrasing of the term tentative manifestations draws attention to efforts to lessen the researcher’s 
authoritative voice and situate phenomenological work as contextual, partial, and incomplete. 
Similarly, attention will be given to the socio-cultural contexts in which these mothers’ 
parenting experiences occur as well as the deeply personal nature of these experiences. 
Melissa: It sounds like you have given this much thought and that you have a pretty 
good idea of why you want to use post-intentional phenomenology. Thank you for helping me 
better understand these distinctions. I look forward to supporting you through the process of 
completing your study. 
Katherine: Well I am still learning, as we always are, and what I explained here is only 
a snapshot of this philosophy and the many ways researchers have drawn on them in their work. 
I always encourage everyone I can to read widely and from many sources, just as I did that 
summer long ago. 
 
References 
 
Applebaum, M. (2012). Phenomenological psychological research as science. Journal of 
Phenomenological Psychology, 43(1), 36-72. 
Broomé, R. E. (2013). The lived-experience of leading a successful police vehicle pursuit: A 
descriptive phenomenological inquiry. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 
44(2), 220-243. 
Dahlberg, K. (2006). The essence of essences – The search for meaning structures in 
phenomenological analysis of lifeworld phenomena. International Journal of 
Qualitative Studies on Health and Well-Being, 1, 11-19. 
Dahlberg, K., Dahlberg, H., and Nyström, M. (2008). Reflective lifeworld research. Lund, 
Sweden: Studentlitteratur. 
Edwards, S. (2006). Experiencing the meaning of breathing. Indo-Pacific Journal of 
Phenomenology, 6(1). Retrieved from www.ipjp.org. 
Gadamer, H-G. (1994). Truth and method. (2nd ed., J. Weinsheimer, & D. G. Marshall, Trans.). 
New York, NY: Continuum (Original work published 1960). 
Giorgi, A. (2000). Concerning the application of phenomenology to caring research. 
Scandinavian Journal of Caring Sciences, 14(1), 11-15. 
Giorgi, A., & Giorgi, B. (2003). The descriptive phenomenological psychological method. In 
P. M. Camic, J. E. Rhodes, & Yardley (Eds.). Qualitative research in psychology: 
Expanding perspectives in methodology and design (pp. 243-273). Washington, DC, 
US: American Psychological Association.  
Giorgi, B. (2011). A phenomenological analysis of the experience of pivotal moments in 
therapy as defined by clients. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 42(1), 61-106. 
Guimond-Plourde, R. (2009). A hermeneutic phenomenological approach to understanding 
stress-coping as an existential phenomenon lived by healthy adolescents. Indo-Pacific 
Journal of Phenomenology, 9(21). Retrieved from www.ipjp.org. 
Heidegger, M. (1998). Being and time (J. Stambaugh, Trans.). Albany, NY: State University 
of New York Press (Original work published in 1927). 
Hove, P. H. (1999). Wonder and the agencies of retreat. Unpublished dissertation, University 
Katherine E. Soule & Melissa Freeman                     871 
of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. 
Husserl, E. (1962). Ideas: General introduction to pure phenomenology (Trans. by W. R. 
Boyce Gibson). London, UK: Collier Books (Original work published in 1913). 
Husserl, E. (1970). The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology (Trans. 
by D. Carr). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press (Original work published 
1936). 
Husserl, E. (2002). Pure phenomenology, its method, and its field of investigation. In D. Moran 
& T. Mooney (Eds.) The phenomenology reader (pp. 124-33). New York, NY: 
Routledge (Original work published 1917). 
Klaskow, T. (2011). “Looking” for intentionality with Heidegger. Symposium: Canadian 
Journal of Continental Philosophy, 15(1), 94-109. 
Lauer, Q. (1958). Phenomenology: Its genesis and prospect. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 
Macann, C. (1993). Four phenomenological philosophers. New York, NY: Routledge. 
McIntyre, R., & Smith, D. W. (1989). Theory of intentionality. In J. N. Mohanty, & W. R. 
McKenna (Eds.), Husserl’s phenomenology: A textbook (pp. 147-179). Washington, 
DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of 
America. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). The primacy of perception: And other essays on phenomenological 
psychology, the philosophy of art, history and politics (J. M. Edie, Trans.). Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Moran, D. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Moran, D. (2002). Editor’s introduction. In D. Moran, & T. Mooney (Eds.) The phenomenology 
reader (pp. 1-26). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Ricoeur, P. (2002). Phenomenology and hermeneutics. In D. Moran, & T. Mooney (Eds.) The 
phenomenology reader (pp. 579-600). New York, NY: Routledge (Original work 
published 1981). 
Sokolowski, R. (2000). Introduction to phenomenology. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Soule, K. E. (2013). Connected: A phenomenology of attachment parenting. Unpublished 
dissertation, The University of Georgia, Athens, GA. 
Vagle, M. D. (2009). Validity as intended: ‘Bursting forth toward’ bridling in 
phenomenological research. International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 
22(5), 585-605. 
Vagle, M. D. (2010). Re-framing Schön’s call for a phenomenology of practice: A post-
intentional approach. Reflective Practice, 11(3), 393-407. 
Vagle, M. D. (2011a). Phenomenology: An assaulting displacement of the social sciences 
[Presentation]. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Education 
Research Association. New Orleans, LA. April 10, 2011. 
Vagle, M. D. (2011b). Post-intentional phenomenology and the egocentric predicament in 
qualitative research [Presentation]. Paper presented at the Seventh International 
Congress of Qualitative Inquiry. Champaign-Urbana, IL. May 20, 2011.  
Vagle, M. D. (2014). Crafting phenomenological research. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast 
Press. 
van Manen, M. (1990). Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive 
pedagogy. Ontario, Canada: State University of New York Press. 
van Manen, M. (2011). Thematic reflection. Retrieved from: 
http://www.phenomenologyonline.com/inquiry/methods-procedures/reflective-
methods/thematic-reflection/ 
 
  
872   The Qualitative Report 2019 
Author Note 
 
Katherine E. Soule is an advisor for the University of California, Agriculture and 
Natural Resources’ Youth, Families, and Communities Program. Her interests are in social 
justice and inclusion. In addition to her programmatic focus, Katherine is interested in 
advancing program evaluation and needs assessments through qualitative methodologies. 
Correspondence regarding this article can be addressed directly to: Katherine Soule, University 
of California Cooperative Extension, 2156 Sierra Way, Suite C, San Luis Obispo, CA 93401. 
Email: kesoule@ucanr.edu.  
Melissa Freeman is a professor of qualitative research methodologies in the University 
of Georgia’s College of Education. Her research focuses on the variety of theoretical 
perspectives and analytical strategies in the construction of meaning and understanding, 
language and dialogue in philosophical and phenomenological hermeneutics, and alternative 
forms of representation in research and evaluation. Correspondence regarding this article can 
also be addressed directly to: Melissa Freeman, University of Georgia, Department of Lifelong 
Education, Administration, and Policy (Qualitative Research), 303 River’s Crossing, 850 
College Station Rd., Athens, GA 30602. Email: freeman9@uga.edu.  
 
Copyright 2019: Katherine E. Soule, Melissa Freeman, and Nova Southeastern 
University. 
 
Article Citation 
 
Soule, K. E., & Freeman, M. (2019). So you want to do post-intentional phenomenological 
research? The Qualitative Report, 24(4), 857-872. Retrieved from 
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/tqr/vol24/iss4/15 
